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ABSTRACT
The study of field fortification from the late 17th 
century to the mid-19th century indicates that fundamental 
principles guided construction techniques and established 
a pattern of thinking in fieldwork design. The applica­
tion of these principles were considered important in the 
eventual success of the work. The principles were based 
on the achievement of maximum benefit through minimal ef­
fort. Continual adherence to a plan of efficient action 
with least effort in fortification construction was essen­
tial as weapons became more effective and strategies and 
tactics more diverse.
The examination of the construction techniques util­
ized in the building of the Civil War defenses around Ra­
leigh, North Carolina demonstrate the basic principles 
common in fieldwork construction during the 18th and 19th 
centuries and provide valuable insight into a relatively 
unexplored event in Raleigh's history.
vi i i
INTRODUCTION
Two major goals in modern archaeological research -- 
historical reconstruction and delineation of cultural pro­
cess -- are often easier to discuss as objectives in mater­
ial culture study than to actually achieve in research. 
Nonetheless, the well-known works of James Deetz (1977) and 
Mark Leone [1978) indicate that the task is not impossible. 
Each has shown that the study of cultural process is largely 
dependent on the utilization of artifacts to convey infor­
mation about the various subsystems of a culture. Hence, 
we are able to see how a culture, not just its technology, 
proceeds and changes through time. The ongoing interaction 
between artifacts and cultural subsystems, whether it be 
the picket fences of the 19th century Mormons in Utah or the 
gravestones of 18th century New Englanders, conveys knowledge 
about the entire culture.
There is little doubt that technology is of concern in 
material culture research. Its relationship to culture, 
however, has been more directly studied by historians of 
technology. They have examined all aspects of the field 
[engineering, art, invention) but have done so with the con­
cern for "how things are done and made" [Daniels, quoted
3from Leone 1978:194). This approach, while offering valu­
able insight into technological processes, rarely does little 
to aid in our understanding the overall cultural process of 
a society.
They are rarely concerned with technology as a social 
phenomenon. They usually deal with complex machines 
of the sort produced by the more recent phases of the 
Industrial Revolution. They are, as historians, con­
cerned with the particular, not with the comparative 
nor the general. They are not cross-cultural nor, as 
historians, are they concerned with applying the goals 
of science to the study of technology. As a consequence, 
they have left most technology, including simple mach­
ines, outside their domain and thus deprived themselves 
of the temporal laboratory in which change could be ex­
amined. As technological determinists, most historians 
of technology have considered technology in and of it­
self, divorced from social and ideological concerns 
(Leone 19 78:195) .
In light of these criticisms, I approach my thesis with 
caution. The preponderance of my- data concerning the evolu­
tion of field fortification forces a strong technological 
bent in its orientation. Nevertheless, technical study need 
not be relegated solely to the investigation of historical 
development.
Students of material culture recognized that fortifi­
cations can be regarded as artifacts and they can thus 
be subjected to the same types of analysis which arti­
facts have undergone after excavation (Babits 1980:1).
Insight can be provided by the analysis of the physical re­
mains of defenses as well as the e xaminat ion of those con­
cerns shared by the military engineers who constructed them. 
The techniques of construction reflect traditional methods 
bound by practical concerns. They allow not only an under-
4standing of "how things are done and made'1 but why "things 
are done and made".
While military technology and strategy played major 
roles in determining the technical features of the fortifi­
cation, concerns for efficiency greatly influenced its ap­
plication at particular sites. To those who directed forti­
fication construction, effective utilization of time, money, 
and labor were noted to be of primary importance because 
such undertakings usually involved great monetary costs and 
intensification of labor. Efficiency was not only found to 
be an economic imperative but a determinant in the success 
or failure of a defensive work (Mahan 1850; Brackenbury 1888). 
The concept of efficiency has been discussed theoretically 
by several writers (Skolimowski 1965; Zipf 1949) and provides 
a good foundation upon which to base a theoretical approach.
Efficiency is of special interest in the study of two 
particular fortification sites. The first includes the Rev­
olutionary War defensive works located along the Delaware 
Pviver in Pennsylvania. The second site includes the Civil 
War fortifications built around Raleigh, North Carolina.
While the characteristics of these works are largely dicta­
ted by the nature of the areas to be defended, they share 
many similarities in technical features as well as concerns 
of those in charge of their construction. In order to better 
understand the association between these two works and the 
common principles which guided field fortification construe-
5tion, it is necessary that they be incorporated in a dis­
cussion of four areas:
1) The evolution of the field fortification from the 
late 17th century to the mid-19th century.
2) Factors influencing the evolution of the field 
fort i fi cat ion.
3) . Historical background of Raleigh during the Civil
War and the building of Raleigh’s defenses.
4) Theoretical concerns and the evaluation of the 
defensive measures taken at Raleigh.
A brief discussion of the Philadelphia defenses in the first 
two chapters will provide considerable insight into some of 
the basic principles of field fortification construction at 
the time of the Revolutionary War. The subsequent, in-depth 
study and historical reconstruction of the P.aleigh fortifi­
cations in chapters three and four will demonstrate the ap­
plication of the same principles some 83 years later.
The historical reconstruction of the Raleigh fortifi­
cations requires not only a discussion of the techniques and 
principles which guided their construction but an investiga­
tion of their influence on the civilian population. To date, 
little research has focused on the defensive measures taken 
at Raleigh and that which has been conducted is of question­
able accuracy. Although specific archival information is 
available on the fortification network there is "no single 
real description of them” (habits 1984:1). The careful
6examination of extant documents, cartographic materials, and 
existing fortification segments provides valuable insight into 
a relatively unexplored, turbulent period in Raleigh’s history.
CHAPTER I
THE EVOLUTION OF FIELD FORTIFICATION,
17th-19th CENTURIES
The pattern of fortification construction practiced 
during the second half of the 19th century was a technical 
art. It was an engineering feat based on several hundred 
years of experimentation; and in fact had its origins dur­
ing prehistoric times (Fagan 1980). As one noted military 
engineer stated a century ago, "the principle is the same 
for the savage as for the most elaborately drilled and armed 
soldier of the nineteenth century; that being, the taking of 
cover from the enemy’s fire” (Brackenbury 1888:2). Whether 
the cover consists of a wall of stone, a fallen log, or a 
mound of earth, fortifications have been part of warfare 
just as warfare has long been part of human culture.
The passage of time led man beyond the sole .use of 
natural barriers for defense and he was gradually pushed into 
the realm of defensive creativity. The massive stone walls 
typical of Jericho (10,000 B.P.) eventually gave rise to the 
castles of the Middle Ages (Figure 1). Castles were very 
impressive structures that proved to be all but impenetrable. 
Their thick stone walls were built on elevated terrain and 
enclosed secure areas. This security encouraged the growth
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Figure 1. The 12th century castle  of La Roche-Pont, 
France (V io lle t-Le-D uc 1876).
of villages and towns within its boundaries. Serious prob­
lems arose, however, by the close of the 15th century. Change 
in weapon technology enabled attackers to destroy castle walls 
and increased range made the enclosed community highly vul­
nerable. New defensive structures were essential.
Engineers began to design fortifications that were much 
more extensive than the confining defenses of the castle.
These new fortifications were far more elaborate than 
the old walls: they had outworks, salients, bastions,
in spearhead form which permitted both the artillery 
and the armed infantry to rake the ranks of the attack­
ing forces, from whatever side they might approach 
(Mumford 1961:358).
VAUBANf S PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS
Economy in construction was of concern to those engin­
eers assigned the task of fortifying cities. The noted 17th 
century French engineer, Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban was 
not only influenced by the basic design elements of the 16th 
century but was ’’economical of the money of the state” (Viol- 
let-Le-Duc 1876:306). Many of his works incorporated pre­
existing fortifications which, in turn, lessened monetary 
costs and necessary labor. In fortifying the town of La Roche 
Pont, for example, he utilized extensively the bastions con­
structed earlier by Errand (Figure 2).
Vauban's defenses were greatly influenced by the 16th 
century Italian school. Vincenzo Scamozzi (1552-1616) con­
tributed substantially to fortification design and was perhaps 
the premier authority on permanent defensive works at this
Figure 2. The 17th century town of La Roche-Pont 
as fortified by Marquis de Vauban 
(V io lle t-Le-D uc 1876).
9time. The works of Scamozzi and his contemporaries, however, 
were flawed by principles not understood until the 17th cen­
tury .
What they had not yet grasped was the importance of 
outworks, in advance of the main rampart, the demi­
lunes, ravelins, tenailles and hornworks of which 
Vauban made such skillful use [Bloomfield 1971:24).
Vauban took the basic design that had emerged a century 
before and elaborated upon it. His designs were more com­
plex and the components of his fortifications were more dis­
tinct [Figure 3). "His great excellence as an engineer was 
shown in the skill with which he adapted the fortifications 
he planned to the defensive requirements of the site..." 
[Mercur 1888:46). Although skillful in his approach, he 
greatly increased the internal complexity of the work. This 
is seen in the description provided by Clarke:
The geometrical foundation of the Vauban systems was the 
bastion trace. Draw a polygon round the area to be de­
fended, make of each a bastioned front, obtain saliency 
and a cross fire over the front of the ravelins. This 
was the foundation to which Vauban, in his so-called 
first system, added little. Supplement this trace by 
any number of counter-guards; place an independent reduit 
in every available angle; build high cavaliers to give 
simultaneous lines of fire; retrench everything retrench- 
able; throwout hornworks, crownworks, tenaillons, demi- 
tenaillons, to the front, thus indefinitely increasing 
geometric possibilities; finally, build a "citadel" in 
which most of the above artifices could be repeated in­
side the mainline, and one arrives at a fair idea of 
what may be termed the linear method of fortification 
[Clarke 1909:7).
Understanding Vauban's system can be facilitated by focusing
on some of the major components which he utilized. The most
noted element of the Vauban works was the large earthen mound.
Figure 3. A detail of one of the outworks of the 
fortified town of La Roche-Pont  
(V io lle t-Le-D uc 1876).
10
This was built in front of the main stone wall and constructed 
of earth excavated from the ground on its interior side. The 
wall and mound were usually of the same height thus creating 
a deep ditch. The exterior slope of the mound was referred 
to as the glacis and varied in the degree of its angle. Its 
main purpose was to protect the wall from artillery fire and, 
in conjunction with the ditch, make infantry assault as dif­
ficult as possible. A path was usually established between 
the base of the inner slope of the mound and the exterior 
edge of the ditch. This path or covered way allowed defend­
ing troops to assemble and quickly retaliate against attack­
ing forces. If not actually engaged in a counter assault, 
defenders could nevertheless occupy
projections of the main wall and ditch combination.
These redans offered the opportunity to bring cross­
fire to bear on most points along the circumferanee 
of a fortress where attacks might be expected, and 
detached strongpoints on the weakest sides of the works, 
redoubts, further impaired the enemy's attempt to crack 
the defensive perimeter (Rothrock 1968:5).
A good example of Vauban's use of these basic components 
was the defensive works around the town of Lisle (Figure 4).
He began work in 1668 after his designs were approved by 
King Louis XIV. Six thousand laborers spent six years build­
ing walls, ditches, and citadels --  all to the specifications
of Vauban. By 16 74, he reported that the majority of the 
fortress had been completed and that its inhabitants were en­
gaged in the construction of their dwellings. The impressive 
nature of the defenses was in part due to the building complex
, a i * * u » i
Figure 4. The 17th century town of Lisle as fortified by Marquis de Vauban
(Clarke 1907).
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on the northwest side of the fortress.
The citadel was comprised of a pentagon fort with bas­
tions and the usual detached works, all surrounded by 
water; and within the wall a great ’’place", 180 paces 
across large barracks, a Governor’s house, a church, an 
arsenal, and other details -- the largest and most com­
pletely equipped citadel yet built in France (Bloom­
field 1971:50).
The fortress of Lisle was one of several permanent de­
fensive works that gave Vauban recognition from his colleagues 
as well as favor from his king. His works, however, have
not been void of recent criticism. The 19th century French
general Marmont wrote that Vauban "was more of an engineer 
than a general, and in making great numbers of fortresses 
he followed the bent of his own predilections" (Marmont quoted 
from Clarke 1909:5). He was involved in the construction of 
as many as 40 fortresses and all were built on one-third of 
France’s frontier. Although Vio1let-Le-Due (18 76) describes 
Vauban as economical in the building of his works, Clarke 
charges that Vauban's fortifications "entombed vast sums of 
money and certainly leave open to question whether the re­
sults obtained were proportionate" (Clarke 1909:5). He fur- 
the r states ,
Vauban’s conception of the use of fortification in re­
lation to strategy was by no means justified by its
results; while to the science in its narrower aspect, 
he contributed little that was of real value (Clarke 
1909 : 5) .
Simply stated, it was the opinion of Clarke and others that 
complication in fortification offered no advantage in defen- 
s ivc war fare.
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FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
While the principles of the Vauban defenses have been 
criticized by some writers, they nevertheless had an impact 
on 18th and 19th century impermanent field fortification.
In the United States, for example, D. H. Mahan wrote exten­
sively on the various concerns of temporary fortification 
construction. He was a professor of engineering at the United 
States Military Academy and his book, A Treatise on Field 
Fortification (1852), was a basic manual for American mili­
tary officers during the second half of the 19th century.
Colonel Charles C. Brackenbury, R.N., one of the fore­
most English authorities on temporary fortifications, wrote 
in a similar manner in his book, Fieldworks: Their Technical
Construction and Tactical Application (1888). He discusses 
the various components of a we 11-fortified site and the im­
portance of each component in its overall success. He notes 
that the main features of such a site include:
1) Some kind of cover which exists or can be constructed 
artificially, but must not be of such a size and con­
struction as to hinder full view of the enemy.
2) Such a general shape of the work as will guard against 
f1ank at tacks.
3) A citadel of some sort to prevent a partial capture 
of the work from being necessarily permanent.
4) Protection from enfilade fire by means of traverses.
5) Complete protection for all the garrison not wanted 
at the time for fighting purposes. This is secured 
by field casemates, which are generally arranged so 
that men can sleep in them (Brackenbury 1888:5).
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Brackenbury discusses in detail these features and recreates 
the 19th century military engineer's "ideal" of a good field­
work .
Construction begins after careful decisions are made as 
to the most advantageous placement of the works. Location 
is often dictated by topography, intended size of the defenses, 
and available construction materials. The size and extent of 
the defenses is dependent on the type of field artillery to 
be used by the enemy and the amount of time and manpower avail­
able. In addition to having a sufficient quantity of labor, 
it is necessary to base judgement on the mental and physical 
condition of the laborers. Brackenbury points out the impor­
tance of these two factors and notes that, if not taken into 
consideration by the commanding officer, they can result in 
the construction of weak defenses. Because the works operate 
as a system, failure in one part can lead to failure of the 
system as a whole.
The three basic forms which earthworks can take include 
closed, half-closed, and open. The three shapes are quite 
obvious, but they each have specific advantages and disadvan­
tages. Closed works are characterized by thick parapets on 
all sides. These allow for temporary protection from artillery 
fire but generally make counterattack very difficult. "They 
are only used in isolated situations or for flanks of a line 
or reserved works" [Brackenbury 1888:38). Half-closed works 
only provide limited protection from enemy artillery and no
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protection from rear attack. These works are usually depen­
dent on rear artillery and infantry backup. If captured, 
they offer the advantage of allowing one’s own artillery and
infantry to attack from the rear --  the unprotected side.
Open works are the easiest type to construct but offer vir­
tually no flank protection. The troops are very dependent 
on the strength of their rear artillery (Figure 5).
The forms described above are very general and the actual 
shape of the fieldwork is dependent largely on the previously 
mentioned factors. There are, however, certain factors that 
are usually associated with large-scale fortification con­
struction. A few of these include traverses, parados, and 
field casemates. Traverses are extended banks of earth and 
usually are not connected with parapets at their ends. These 
extensions are commonly found in closed works but are also 
found with other defenses. Their purpose is to protect the 
flanks and intercept enemy fire. One example of a large 
traverse is a parados. It is designed and situated to pro­
tect the rear of the work during attack from the front. With­
out this feature, it is doubtful that the fieldwork would be 
succes s ful.
The success of the fieldwork is not only dependent on 
provisions made for the protection of the troops and artillery 
but also on provisions for sheltering inactive troops. Rest 
plays a vital role in battles of long duration. To accomodate 
fatigued troops, field casemates are often constructed (Figure 6).
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While these bombproof covers can serve their purpose, they 
are usually built in limited numbers. They are an elabora­
tion of the shelter trench and require a great deal of time 
and labor to adequately construct. Brackenbury states that 
"it is well to think twice or thrice before occupying a de­
fensive position which needs to be so strengthened, and which 
may carry with its fall the capture of the whole army” 
(Brackenbury 1888:39).
Another important aspect of the successful fortification 
is the use of obstacles. These vary in degree of effective­
ness but all are intended to slow the advance of the enemy.
Prior to laying obstacles, it is necessary to clear as much 
territory around the defenses as possible. This includes all 
types of foliage that could be used as cover by the attacker. 
Obstacles are then laid out, often in a concentrated manner. 
Those commonly used include cheveaux-de-frises, fraises, abatis, 
and palisades (Figure 7). Cheveaux-de-frises are pointed 
spikes that are driven through a beam. Often constructed out 
of available timber, these spikes present a formidable bar­
rier. They are generally placed well in front of the forti­
fication ditch. The ditch is usually v-shaped and thus pre­
vents the congregation of enemy troops below the line of fire.
As an additional obstacle, an abatis is usually added. This 
is usually a small tree that contains a protrusion of sharp­
ened branches. Fraises are also sharpened spikes or small 
posts that are set in the bottom of a frontal trench. In
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addition to the base of the trench, they may also be set 
horizontally into the rampart. If time allows, a series of 
sharpened posts can be placed along the interior of the 
fortification. The resulting palisade provides a good ob­
stacle to infantry assault but is time consuming in its 
construction.
The obstacles and features that have been described are
often directly associated with closed or half-closed works.
They may also be associated with less complex works known as
shelter trenches (rifle pits). Of all the fieldworks of which
Brackenbury has knowledge, he favors the shelter trench. It
can be constructed in a short period of time and yet be very
effective (Figure 8).
It is not intended to be an obstacle 'in itself. Shelter 
trenches should begin with the shortest unit of time 
allowed to construct the minimum of cover, and be then 
developed, if required, through the forms of more pro­
tective shelter trenches up to that of the field parapet 
with its ditch (Brackenbury 1888:30).
In addition to the obvious advantage of constructing this 
simple fieldwork is the disadvantage it gives to the enemy.
It has no frontal ditch which can offer quick refuge to an 
attacker and thus eliminates the need for flank defense.
The simple trench shelter offers another distinct ad­
vantage in that a line of '’communication” can be established. 
This term refers to the presence of an exit within the works 
that will allow a hasty retreat or a rapid counterattack. 
Brackenbury states that :
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the whole intention of fortification, as of tactics and 
other branches of the art of war, is not so much to kill 
numbers of the enemy while saving our own side, as to 
produce the greatest effect of moral depression on the 
survivors of the enemy and put our own troops in the 
highest spirits. A long continuous defense will never 
do this (Brackenbury 1888:6).
Brackenbury states that allowing proper communication is 
essential "because the tendency of all works, whether field 
or permanent, is to teach habits of inactivity which can soon 
become fatal" (Brackenbury 1888:6). If simplicity succumbs 
to elaboration and such components are neglected, then the 
success of the fieldwork will be in question. "Beware of 
being led into the expenditure of too much time and energy" 
(Brackenbury 1888:32).
THE AMERICAN DEFENSES OF PHILADELPHIA
The technical aspects of 19th century fieldworks were 
of advanced engineering design that offered great advantage 
in defensive warfare. As mentioned above, the success of the 
works was contingent on the satisfaction of certain design 
requirements. It is interesting to note that these require­
ments did not emerge during the second half of the 19th cen­
tury but were known to military engineers during the Revolu­
tionary War. Evidence of such knowledge is best seen in the 
work of Worthington C. Ford. His book, Defenses of Phila­
delphia in 1777 (1897), is a compilation of documents that 
provide a record of the Councils of War held by Washington. 
These documents contain war-related information; part of 
which concerns the building of defenses around Philadelphia.
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On May 31, 1777, Washington wrote to Governor Patrick 
Henry of the expected sailing of a large fleet of the 
enemy -- estimated at a hundred sail -- from New York. 
What General Howe’s immediate object was could only be 
conjectured; but it is believed that he had one of two 
purposes: either to possess the Hudson River or to at­
tack Philadelphia by way of the Delaware (Ford 19 71:1).
Washington suspected that Howe's aim was to attack Philadel­
phia. He therefore solicited advice from his general offi­
cers on how best to fortify the city.
Suggestions for the defense of the city focused primarily 
on the building of fortifications at strategic points along 
the Delaware River or strengthening those already in existence 
at these locations. These points included Bi 1 lingsport, Der­
by's Creek, Red Bank, and Fort Island (Figure 9). Comments 
and opinions on the vulnerability of these locations was the 
main content of those responses sent to General Washington. 
There was also correspondence between generals in reference 
to the preparations necessary at these locations. These are 
important in that they contain significant comments on both 
American and British fieldworks. General Washington, for 
example, wrote Colonel Christopher Green:
Sir,
I am led to believe from the conversation I have had 
with Lieutenant Colonel Green, that you have made Fort 
Mercer impregnable against an assault; and that nothing 
is to be feared but from regular approaches and shells 
-- to guard against the first, it would be found neces­
sary to have some out works, which time may, possibly 
allow you raise -- to secure the garrison against the 
second, some Bombproofs (casemates) should be constructed 
-- The first you can easily do, but how far the other 
is practicable I know not, for want of competent know­
ledge of the place -- its extent -- I would suggest to 
you, however, by way of quaere, whether caverns could
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not be cut out of the Bank below the work, and sup­
ported (the earth) by Pillars, would not be the quick­
est, and most effectual method -- If this should bo 
found to answer, all your men, in case of a Bombardment, 
might be concealed in them, except such as should be 
necessary for guards (Washington quoted from Ford 
1971 : 81) .
Washington's brief description of Fort Mercer is supplemented 
by a reference to a fort on Hog’s Island. Du Coudray, Wash­
ington’s engineer in charge of the defenses of Philadelphia, 
states that
the fort where this battery lies is very bad, being in­
closed, only on two fronts, byo one palisade with bad 
loopholes, and very ill flanked; but as the enemy can 
Land there, only with chaloupes, it may Resist Long 
time, even in this weak situation, with six or seven 
hundred men to guard it; specialy if the army was not 
far off (Du Coudray quoted from Ford 1971:16).
In addition to having an understanding of structural
design within the interior of the defenses, officers had
knowledge of numerous obstacles that could hinder an assault.
An American officer stated that
The Enemy have enlarged the upper battery opposite the 
Fort, we this morning discover 5 Embrasures, masked as 
yet with Fascines -- it is probable that they will open 
at once -- their prospect seems to be, to knock down 
our palisades, and storm our west front between the two 
block houses. To cover our palisades on this side we 
have applied to General Varnum to furnish us with fas­
cines, which we shall place on the Summit of the bank 
to serve instead of earth, which is not to be had -- I 
don't know whether we shall be able to procure the Fas­
cines (Journal quoted from Ford 1971:99).
Palisades we re popular obstacles but officers also noted the
use of pickets, abatis, and cheveaux-de-frises. The chcvcaux-
de-frises were not only used as obstacles on land but placed
across shallow rivers. They temporarily blocked the passage
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of ships and hindered the major means of transporting troops, 
ammunition, and provisions.
Obstacles were but a part of a complex pattern utilized 
during the Revolutionary War. Both British and American en­
gineers were not only aware of the function of the various 
fortification components but were concerned with the most 
efficient use of labor and time. Many of the officers direct­
ly questioned the practicality of building and strengthening 
certain defenses. There was a prevailing attitude of caution 
throughout the correspondence against the unnecessary use of 
money, time, and labor (Ford 1971). The Congress and the 
Continental Army had none to spare. One of the most out­
spoken proponents of such a policy was Major General Nathaniel 
Greene. In his reply to General Washington, he stated that 
he was against extensive development of any fortifications 
at any of the strategic points along the Delaware. To com­
plete such works (at just one of the location) would require 
the labor of a large number of troops, not to mention the 
number needed to garrison the works. Me estimated the need 
of at least 1200 men at Billingsport alone and stated that
there have been prodigous sums of money expended at that 
place and people have taught to expect great security 
from its strength. To abandon it at this time might 
alarm their fears, and give the dis'posed a handle to 
censure the leaders of the people for subjecting the 
Continent to such fruitless and unnecessary expense. 
Although these reasons urge strongly for holding the 
work, yet those that offer themselves for abandoning it, 
operate more forcibly with me (Greene quoted from Ford 
1971:8).
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He noted that the present works at Billingsport lacked two 
major features -- casemates and a proper line of communica­
tion. The fort would last a very short time if it came under 
siege and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
garrison to retreat. Similar problems existed at Red Bank 
and Derby’s Creek.
Greene favored the type of fortification advocated by 
Brackenbury a century later. He proposed that simple trenches 
be dug for use by infantry and half-moon parapets be thrown up 
for artillery. The advantage to such defenses was that they 
could be quickly constructed at various points and would re­
quire limited troops. These defenses could be easily abandon­
ed and would in turn be of little strategic value if captured. 
If extensive fieldworks were constructed, and eventually cap­
tured by the enemy, grave consequences could result. The well- 
armed British could easily supply these works with cannon. 
Greene conceded that all forts along the Delaware would event­
ually fall under British siege. He concluded that !'the coun­
try cannot be conquer’d and held in subjection but by gar­
risons; it should be our policy, therefore, to have as few 
as may be" [Greene quoted from Ford 1971:11).
CHAPTER II
THE IMPACT OF WEAPON TECHNOLOGY AND WARFARE STRATEGY 
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD FORTIFICATION
The engineering principles which guided field fortifica­
tion construction during the 18th and 19th centuries were the 
contributions of a number of early engineers, Vauban having 
been the most celebrated. These principles have an irrefu­
table link to weapon technology and warfare strategy. Clarke 
(1909:6) states that
fortification and tactics have but one and the same ba­
sis in all ages, and that is the power, in the widest 
possible sense, of the weapons of the attack and defense. 
The only scientific fortification is that which enables 
the defender to use his weapons to the best advantage, 
while minimizing the potency of the weapons of the at­
tacker .
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY WEAPON TECHNOLOGY
As discussed earlier, the 17th century fortresses of 
France had a number of complex geometrical elements incor­
porating ■massive earthen walls and extensive ditches. Con­
trary to the criticisms lodged against these defenses, their 
validity is somewhat restored when one reviews the nature of 
17th century warfare.
Benjamin Franklin suggested to Charles Lee, in a letter 
dated February 11, 1776, that
pikes could be introduced and I would add bows and arrows. 
These were good weapons, not wisely laid aside;
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1st Because a man may shoot as truly with a bow as with 
a common musket.
2ndly He can discharge four arrows in the time of char­
ging and discharging one bullet.
3rdly Mis object is not taken from his view by the smoke 
of his own side.
4thly A flight of arrows, seen coming upon them, terri­
fies and disturbs the enemies’ attention to their busi­
ness.
Sthly An arrow striking in any part of a man puts him 
"hors de combat" till it is extracted.
6thly Bows and arrows are more easily provided every­
where than muskets and ammunition (Franklin quoted from 
Esper 1965 : 382).
It is interesting and perhaps ironic that two centuries prior 
to this correspondence, the firearm had replaced the longbow 
and by the 17th century it had become firmly established as 
the principal military weapon. The irony of this situation 
can be understood by examining the inadequacies of the wea­
pons and the difficulties it placed on offensive warfare.
The major firearm of the first half of the 17th century 
was the matchlock musket. Although Neuman (1967) notes the 
use of the flintlock as early as 1550 in Europe, the match­
lock was considered by the soldier to be more reliable. This 
preference required the acceptance of many inconveniences. 
These consisted of:
(1) protecting the weapon (powder) from moisture;
(2) keeping matches burning in the presence of an enemy
and thus, often betraying position by light, smoke, 
and odor;
(3) poor range (100 to 200 paces) and slow loading
meant that fire could be maintained only by a deep
formation --  six men deep, more or less (Spaulding,
Nickerson, and Wright 1925:497).
Likewise, artillery weapons of this period presented
major logistical problems as well as serious hazards. It was 
not unusual for a battery of ten, 24-pounders to require as 
much as twelve tons of shot and six tons of powder for one 
day’s operation. Transporting large quantities of munitions 
with relatively few guns lessened the advantage of having 
such weapons for use on the battlefield. The imposing dangers 
of artillery also hindered its effective use. The often poor 
quality of the powder and its slow burning would "more often 
than not leave smoldering powder in the gun after the round 
had been fired. Before reloading it was imperative to swab 
out the gun thoroughly, lest the next charge pre-ignite, an 
occurence frequently fatal for gunners” (Rothrock 1968:5).
The smoldering powder also tended to glaze the barrel of the 
weapon thus making the bore diameter uneven. Balls were not 
fired smoothly greatly decreasing their range and accuracy.
A great deal of the 17th century was characterized by 
the use of weapons that lead one to question the reasoning 
for their acceptance. They were generally unreliable, dan­
gerous to the user, and often dependent on acceptable weather. 
Such complications were not characteristic of the longbow.
The superiority of this weapon over the firearm was recog­
nized by many individuals well into the 18th century. Most 
critics wrote extensively during the period of its replace­
ment by the firearm. Sir John Smythe (1590) was typical of 
those who pointed out the many shortcomings of the new weap-
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on. To counter this wave of criticism, advocates pointed out 
some of the advantages of the firearm. Sir Roger Williams, 
for example, stated that "munition that belongs unto the bow 
men, are not so commonly found in all places, especially 
arrows, as powder is unto other shot" [quoted from Esper 
1965:386) .
The replacement of the longbow in the English army lias 
been recently studied by Thomas Esper (1965). He concluded 
that the replacement was due to a number of factors not nec­
essarily limited to the military establishment. The key to 
understanding one of the principal reasons is found in the 
statement of the 16th century writer Humfrey Barwick. He 
states that "any qualified archer was expected to shoot a 
dozen arrows in one minute at a man-sized target two hundred 
and forty yards away -- and hit it with all twelve" (quoted 
from Esper 1965:388). While somewhat exaggerating his point, 
he nevertheless uses the term "qualified". The majority of 
17th century English soldiers were not trained in archery.
The onetime national sport had declined in popularity and 
given way to "unlawful games". In essence, the average 
soldier lacked the years of experience necessary to be a good 
archer.
If one considers the manner in which armies were raised 
in Elizabeth’s reign, when quite often vagabonds and 
the most wretched were pressed into service, it is 
understandable that the soldiers were generally poor 
archers and their weapons, poorly used, inferior to 
firearms (Esper 1965:391).
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WARFARE STRATEGY IN THE 17th CENTURY
The weapon technology of the 17th century greatly in­
fluenced the warfare strategy of the period. The inadequa­
cies of the firearm and logistical problems of the artillery 
were coupled with armies that could not be easily mobilized. 
More time was spent maneuvering armies into favorable posi­
tions than was actually spent in battle.
Field battles were usually a matter of tacit agreement 
between opposing commanders to essay a trial of force 
where each thought he saw a margin of victory, unless 
one's forces had -- as only rarely happened -- attained 
a position that forced the enemy to defend against an 
advance at any cost (Rothrock 1968:8) .
Commanders could literally not afford to be reckless in their
engagements. Troop replacements in the field were few and
munitions slow in coming.
Armies often maintained a series of fortified cities
under their control. Their massive defensive enclosures
offered a safe haven for beleaguered troops and the viable
economy of the city usually allowed quick resupply of needed
materials. Extended occupation usually led to siege warfare
by the enemy. This was the preferred type of engagement by
opposing forces, each believing that their position held
special advantage. "To Louis XIV, to his war minister Louvois,
and to his chief engineer Vauban, war of position appealed
with special fascination" (Rothrock 1968:10). This was in
part due to the prevailing cautious attitude of military
leaders and their failure to commit their forces to battle
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on the open field. This fascination was also the result of 
the obvious advantages of the 17th century fortress. Direct 
infantry assault was rarely attempted. The only means by 
which a fortress could be taken was through the construction 
of siege lines. A special engineering feat in itself, such 
lines enabled both artillery and infantry to achieve closer 
positions to the defenses. Vauban, noted for his contribu­
tions to defensive warfare, had extensive knowledge of such 
operations. He warned repeatly that siege lines exposed the 
vulnerability of defenses and that no fortress !Tcould ever be 
designed that would be impregnable to a determined and well- 
supplied enemy" (Rothrock 1968:10).
THE EMERGENCE OF THE FIELD FORTIFICATION
The end of the 17th century was characterized by certain 
changes in military organization that were to have a profound 
influence on 18th century warfare. These changes included an 
increased number of professional soldiers and greater struc- 
turalization within the military establishment. The once 
large, uncontrolled mass of infantry was refined into precise 
units and characterized by rigid formality. It was recog­
nized that, if infantry were to be effective on the open field, 
organization was essential. This was influenced by the tac­
tics of war at the turn of the century. Military leaders had 
long known that "maximum fire power was the desideratum; with 
the weapons of the day the dense line was the formation that 
gave it; a new system of command to handle it could not be
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improvised; hence "linear tactics" (Spaulding, Nickerson, and 
Wright 1925:531). Such tactics had one major principle and 
that was for each soldier to maintain the "line". This bat­
tle formation required not only rapid deployment from the line 
of march but a great deal of discipline under fire.
Better organization and new tactics were conditions which 
"led to the extended use of fortified lines -- not only chains 
of fortresses like Vauban's, but systems of field entrenchments 
to cover a whole province: (Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright
1925:532). They usually connected a series of fortified posts 
and were often themselves protected by barriers incorporated 
into their design. The French (1702), for example, used water 
inundation to protect their lines along the Dutch frontier. 
Similar barriers were used in building extensive works in the 
upper Rhine Valley during the fist decade of the century. 
"LINEAR" TACTICS, TRADITIONALISM, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Although the advantages of good field fortification were 
realized during the first half of the 18th century, tactical 
concerns continued to be influenced by offensive warfare. The 
"linear" method retained its popularity, although adjustments 
were required to lessen the defender's advantage. To counter 
the deadly effects of vollies fired from fortified positions, 
regular infantry depended on an advanced guard of skirmishers. 
These troops did not proceed in line formation but rather in 
a dispersed manner. They engaged the enemy and allowed wing 
formations of the regular troops to assume flank positions. 
Reserve mounted troops often followed the rapid advance of
regular infantry and exploited the broken ranks of the enemy's 
formation. This was facilitated by massing artillery for the 
assault and, prior to the arrival of cavalry, blasting the 
enemy with caseshot (Falls 1961).
The true advantage of defending a we 11-fortified site 
was perhaps not fully appreciated because of the continued 
limitations of the firearm. Improvements such as the flint­
lock over the wheellock and earlier matchlock did little to 
increase range or rate of fire. The rifled musket could not 
totally rectify these inadequacies. It was plagued by an 
"even slower rate of fire than the smoothbore and was more 
fragile. Armies, therefore, rejected rifles for general use 
and issued them only to a few specialists units" (Ross 1979:24) 
Eighteenth century firearms and tactics each contributed 
to the perpetuation of military tradition on the European 
battlefield. Flexibility and elasticity had become acceptable 
in tactical maneuvers but officers continued to engage in 
battle utilizing line formations. This tactic had been largely 
confined to Europe and had not been adequately tested on dis­
tant battlefields. One such example of its use was in the 
1755 expedition of General Edward Braddock in the United States 
According to Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright (1925:569)
the general's experience had been in European wars of 
the Marlborough type, and he could not see that in the 
Indians he had to meet anything more serious than Euro­
pean light troops, which were helpless against a line 
of battle. Mis dispositions when nearing Fort Dusquesne 
showed no lack of caution or skill. There was no distant 
reconnaissance but there was a proper use of advanced
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guard and flanking parties. The enemy was discovered 
in plenty of time, and the advanced guard, commanded 
oy Colonel Thomas Gage, formed line and repulsed the 
first attack handsomely. But the Indians spread around 
the flanks and commenced a steady individual fire. The 
troops showed discipline and steadiness, but could find 
nothing to attack. The expedition ended in utter dis­
aster.
The British experience in the United States did not end 
with the Indian wars but rather was continued in the American 
Revolution. This conflict brought together opposing forces 
which differed greatly in the number and quality of troops.
The superior number of British land forces were well-organ­
ized, disciplined, and backed by a large navy. Supplied with 
adequate weapons and munitions, British commanders had no 
reason to alter the tactics to which they were accustomed.
They were no longer fighting the Indians but rather the Amer­
icans and the French. It was not surprising that their enemy, 
likewise, was pressed by tradition to engage in the tactics 
of war suitable to Europeans.
It was soon recognized by the Americans that victory 
over the British could not be achieved by traditional warfare 
methods. Linear tactics favored those who were superior in 
number, we 11-trained, and better equipped. Thus, fortifica­
tions and individual fire became important tactics in the 
American army. Strong defensive positions reduced the advan­
tage given to a superior number of enemy but could only do so 
for a limited period of time.
Indefinite occupation of fortified positions was impos-
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sible. A good example of this principle was seen in the 
American occupation of Philadelphia's defenses. Several 
of these fortifications were originally constructed by the 
British prior to the Revolution. In 1771, a sum of 15,0 00 
pounds was granted for the defense of the city by the Penn­
sylvania Assembly. A portion of this money was used to pur­
chase a small island located approximately eight miles down 
the Delaware River. British Captain of Engineers John Mont- 
resor supervised militia and civilian laborers in the con­
struction of a large redoubt on this island. Three years 
later, Penn noted in his January 20, 1774 address to the
Assembly that
you will, on Enquiry, find that the work, so far as it 
has been executed, is done in a masterly Manner; and 
that Materials to a considerable Value are on the Spot, 
ready to continue it as soon as the season will admit 
(Penn quoted from the Pennsylvania Archives 1935:7079).
Following Penn's assessment of the defenses, he provided a
partial itemization of expenses entailed from fortification
construction. Numerous workmen are noted as having received
payment for their labor on the defenses. While payments were
made to some individuals, Penn states that attention is being
directed as to "how much is yet in Arrear to the workmen"
(Penn quoted from the Pennsylvania Archives 1935:7079).
The defenses of Fort Island fell into the hands of the
Pennsylvania militia in 1 775. Extensive improvemei. ts were
carried out and
the completed fortification, called fort Mifflin, cov­
ered the southern tip of the Island, which was little
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more than an easily-flooded mud flat. The fort had 
stone walls on the south and east sides, and log pal- 
lisades and earthen embankments enclosed the rest of 
it (Lender 1979:14).
In refurbishing this fortification and other defensive works, 
the Americans also utilized civilian labor. This was favor­
able to many of Washington's engineers. His chief engineer, 
in reference to the defense work at 3i11ingsport, stated that
if the Government intend to unite all their efforts in 
finishing this fort, I would propose to hire instead of
militiamen, workment by the day, which after exact cal­
culation of all expenses, will cost incomparably less,
I believe, will work a great deal more, give far less
trouble to those who conduct the works, and not consume
such an immense quantity of tools of all kinds (Du 
Coudray quoted from Ford 1971:44).
The strengthening of the defenses on Fort Island and 
Billingsport were obvious attempts to deny the British a major 
means of access to Philadelphia. Members of Washington’s 
Council of War were convinced that the city would be attacked 
by the British Navy; probably by siege. If the British could 
not be stopped down river, then American control of the city 
would be lost. American forces had become dispersed along the 
river defenses and were not in position to defend landward 
approaches. Consequently, on September 26, 1777, the forces
of General Charles Cornwallis approached the city by land 
and took possession unopposed. American strategy then turned 
towards holding the river defenses and preventing British 
supply ships from reaching port. Superior British firepower 
placed the defenses under heavy siege and the works were 
gradually abandoned. On November 15th, Fort Mifflin was
taken and by the 2 3rd Washington conceded in a letter to 
Congress that "the enemy are now in possession of all the 
water defenses" (Washington quoted from Oberholtzer 1912:269).
The abandonment of the defenses was the result of the 
inability of the Americans to maintain a continuous defense 
under siege. This action was a reflection of the limited 
value of fortified sites under certain conditions. Sometimes, 
however, conditions allowed for great success. Prior to the 
abandonment of Fort Mercer on November 30th, its garrison 
defeated a large number of Hessian troops. Their attack was
launched against a fort that was deceptive in its appearance.
The first enemy column crossed the abandoned outworks "and 
unconscious that they had been designedly abandoned, they 
thought in the excitement of the first surprise that the en­
tire fort was their own" (Stryker 1901:18). Remaining Hessian 
forces approached the defensive works and it was then that 
the garrison, concealed within the inner entrenchments, opened 
fire. The impact of the fire from the loopholes along the 
mainline was tremendous and angles created by the defenses
allowed devasting crossfire on the Hessian flank. The de­
feated Hessian forces suffered a large number of casualties, 
including the officer who claimed that he would take the fort 
with no mercy for its defenders.
WiiAPON TECHNOLOGY AND WARFARE STRATEGY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
WAR
The developments in 19th century weapon technology had 
a profound influence on the extensive use of fortification
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during the Civil War. Its impact can be seen not only in 
the variety of firearms and artillery produced by domestic 
and foreign contractors, but by certain shared features which 
proved the weapons superior to those of earlier periods.
Perhaps the most important feature to gain acceptance 
was the rifling of firearms. Rifled muskets had been issued 
to special troops during the Revolution but were not accept­
able for standard issue. The popular smoothbore musket con­
tinued into the 19th century and was the principal shoulder 
weapon stocked in Federal arsenals by mid-century. During 
the early months of the Civil War, the smoothbore was one of 
several ’’obsolete weapons called back into service. This 
was true even with flintlocks, especially in some Confederate 
units” (Lord 1965:242).
The rifle became an effective infantry weapon after the 
development of the modern bullet, a conical projectile 
with a hollow or brass base which expands to take the 
grooves in the barrel. The percussion cap was an im­
provement over the flintlock. Breech-loading increased 
the rate of fire and made it possible to load from a 
prone or running position. The muzzle loader hung on for 
a time because it was easier to manufacture and existing 
stocks of muskets could be converted into rifles, but 
all of these inventions eventually enabled the infantry 
to deliver more fire at longer ranges. This out-moded 
Napoleonic artillery tactics, which had smashed at the 
enemy's tight formations with case shot (which had the 
same effect as later shrapnel) from outside musket range 
(Ropp 1962 : 162) .
Advances in 19th century artillery owed much to develop­
ments introduced in earlier periods. For example, breech- 
loading was introduced as early as the 15th century and straight 
grooved rifling in the 16th century. Breech-loading artillery
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pieces were used to a limited extent by Federal and Confed­
erate forces during the war. Ordinance officers, however, 
tended to prefer the use of the muzzle loaders. This pref­
erence continued throughout the 19th century despite the 
benefits offered from such an innovation. Rifling of cannon 
was more readily accepted but, as in the shoulder weapon, was 
not universal until the second half of the 19th century. Many 
smoothbore pieces were used throughout the war, especially by 
the Confederates. A disadvantage in using the rifled piece 
was that it had
to be served more carefully than the smoothbore. Rifling 
grooves were cleaned with a moist sponge, and sometimes 
oiled with another sponge. Lead-coated projectiles like 
the James, whicli tended to foul the grooves of the piece, 
made it necessary to scrape the rifle grooves after every 
half dozen shots, although guns using brass-banded pro­
jectiles did not require the extra operation (Lord 1965:24).
In addition to rifling artillery with twisted grooves,
several other advances were made which increased the range
and accuracy of the cannon. Falls notes that
their transformation was due to rapid and continuous 
improvement in a number of respects. The gun itself, 
instead of being cast, was made of wrought iron bands 
from the tunnions (the projections which rested on the 
carriage) to the breech. With stouter guns more 
powerful propellants could be employed, and by 1861 
one was available in the form of nitroglycerine. The 
other type of explosive used by artillery, the charge 
in the shell, was also increased in violence (Falls 
1961:6 4).
These developments had a major impact on the tactics of war 
practiced during the mid-19th century.
In addition to the advances in weapon technology, sev-
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eral other factors influenced the tactics or strategies of 
war adopted by the Confederate and Federal armies. Military 
tradition, for example, was maintained by the leading offi­
cers of the opposing armies. Many were graduates of West 
Point and their training based on French tactics adopted in 
the previous century. Ross [1979) and Ropp (1962) have noted 
not only the popularity of French drill in the United States 
army but also of French tactics of troop deployment in the 
field. The frontal assault of strategic areas was the prin­
cipal means of attack recognized by commanders during the 
first half of the war. It was not until 1863 that a major
shift in tactics took place. Wave after wave of attacking
infantry was no longer an effective maneuver in the field.
More often than not, such Napoleonic tactics proved fatal.
"The skirmishing formation was now the normal tactical order"
(Ropp 1962:162). This was in part due to the increased
utilization and availablity of more effective weapons and 
basic differences in the opposing armies.
The Confederate forces essentially fought a defensive 
war. "Because they could not hope to conquer the Northern 
States, their problem was to resist conquest. In other words, 
to tire the Federals out, and force them to abandon the war" 
(Fuller 1961:101) . In order to accomplish this, the Confed­
erates depended a great deal on strong fortified positions. 
Successful attack against such positions usually required a 
superiority in troops of 3 to 1. This lessened the advantage
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given to the superior number of Federal forces. Eventually, 
the extensive use of defensive works characterized both sides 
and ended the traditional tactics of assault. The skirmish 
formation was adopted on a large scale and had implications 
far beyond its restrictive use on the battlefield. Loose- 
knit raiding parties attacked the economic base of the Con­
federacy. Gradual destruction and capture of numerous port 
and railroad facilities shook the foundation upon which the 
South rested. The tactical advantage of maintaining defen­
sive position could not continue indefinitely; especially if 
severed from the economic centers of resupply.
CHAPTER III
THE RALEIGH FORTIFICATIONS 
In order to adequately study the Confederate fortifi­
cations of Raleigh, North Carolina, it is necessary to in­
vestigate the circumstances leading to their construction.
The task can best be accomplished by '’recreating" Raleigh 
during the early 1860s and focusing on its role as a Con­
federate capital during the Civil War. The investigation 
is facilitated by documentary evidence which describes the 
conditions in P.aleigh during the war and provides insight 
into the defensive measures taken to protect the city.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout the Civil War years, North Carolina and its 
capital played an important role in supplying the Confederate 
army with the various goods and services demanded by war. 
Raleigh, like the capitals of the other southern states, was 
the primary economic and administrative center that maintained 
the state as a productive member of the Confederate States of 
America. Raleigh was surrounded by various mills, virtually 
all of which produced goods needed in the war effort. One 
such mill, Whitaker’s Mill, was located on Crabtree Creek and 
had been in operation since its construction in 1777. Dur­
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ing the war it was primarily used in producing black powder. 
This was sold to the Confederate government for $1.75 a pound. 
Another important mill, known at various times for its pro­
duction of lumber, wheat, and wool carding, was Yates Mill.
It was located on Yates Pond, south of Raleigh.
At Raleigh and Fayetteville were paper mills; and there 
were thirty-nine cotton factories and seven wollen mills. 
These made yarn and cloth, and throughout the state, hand 
looms and spinning jennys came into use by those who 
could obtain them. Wooden shoes, pikes, caps, and powder 
were also made at Raleigh (Ashe 192 5:65) .
Governor Vance encouraged home manufacture of everything that
was needed for the war. He made sure that all North Carolina
troops were well supplied with clothing, shoes, and blankets.
"The Confederacy, on one or two occasions, drew on the depot
at Raleigh for clothing for other troops” (Curry 1900:81).
Throughout the war, Vance made available to the soldiers of
other states quantities of shoes, blankets, and clothing.
Along with the many industrial sites that were located
just outside the town and important businesses within, one
cannot overlook the importance of the railroad system. Two
important railroads connected with Raleigh in 1861 and the
same extensions exist today; only the names have changed.
From 1861 to 1865, the North Carolina Railroad connected
Raleigh with the towns of Greensboro, Goldsboro, and other
parts of the state (Figure 10). By 1896, the railroad system
had been renamed as Southern Railroad and is called the same
today. The Weldon and Gaston Railroad also connected with
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o ^
•o
-Co»
go
40
Raleigh during the war years. It entered the town from the 
south and continued, parallel to the North Carolina Railroad 
for some distance, in a northeasterly direction. After the 
war, the railroad was renamed as the Raleigh and Gaston Rail­
road. The same extension is known today as the Seaboard 
Coast Line. It is interesting to note that so few changes 
have taken place since the Civil War in the railroad systems 
connecting directly with the capital. It is important his­
torically with regard to the strategic location of a section 
of fortifications constructed around Raleigh.C>
The railroads were the most efficient means of trans­
porting large numbers of soldiers and vital supplies to Con­
federate troops. Without this network, Raleigh would not have 
been an asset to the southern cause. The railroads not only 
carried soldiers and supplies out but wounded in. Raleigh 
was the site of the state's first Confederate military hos­
pital. Approximately three different hospitals were estab­
lished in Raleigh during the war. One hospital was located 
in the newly constructed buildings of Peace Institute (1863), 
known today as Peace College, which was located in the north­
ern part of the town not far from the tracks of the Weldon 
and Gaston Railroad. A second military hospital was estab­
lished west of town in the area that is today occupied by the 
state farigrounds. The third hospital was of less importance 
than the previous two and was located in southeast Raleigh.
By the end of 1862, the citizens of Raleigh were making
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virtually every effort to carry their share of the burden of 
the war. They were encouraged to conserve what little was 
available and to do without those things that were not abso­
lutely necessary. As the war dragged on, this was not a dif­
ficult task. Prices skyrocketed and people were left to sur­
vive only on the essentials. The Ladies Aid Society of Ra­
leigh attempted to provide relief for a great number of im­
poverished citizens. Its efforts were hindered by the exor­
bitant costs of many items. A treasurer's account with the 
Ladies Aid Society list the purchase of the following items:
Raleigh, N.C. 1864 March 13 100 lbs Sugar $20 lb $2000.00
1 Keg Lard 84 lbs $10 lb $840.00 
1 lb Tea $150.00 (Coker 1966).
Calico sold for $30 a yard; a pair of cotton socks for $10;
a white straw hat for $20; and a bushel of meal for $25.
Adding to their economic difficulties, citizens were asked
to make food contributions to military training camps outside
of town.
As the war progressed, Federal soldiers also made them­
selves felt by raiding towns not far from the capital. One 
such raid took place at Rocky Mount on July 29, 1863. The
Battle's Cotton Factory was burned and storehouses were des­
troyed. The governor and the citizens of Raleigh realized 
that the capital could be a prime target for a raid by Fed­
eral cavalry.
Cavalry raids are getting to be serious things to the 
people of the Confederacy -- especially to the quiet 
inhabitants of this goodly city, who don't know whether
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they will be permitted to sleep in their own beds to­
night. The raid on the IV and W Railroad, at Warsaw has 
put our people to thinking, and, we hope, to acting al­
so. There is no way to protect the country against 
these raids but to put every man able to bear arms on 
a war footing. Hence we hope that the legislature will 
pass at once, the "Raid Bill", or something like it, 
by which every white male person, physically able to 
handle a gun, from 16 to 50 or 60, may be enrolled and 
kept ready to assemble for home protection at a moments 
notice.
This is an emergency -- this city is in peril -- and 
those who have as yet found excuses for doing nothing, 
who have not lifted a finger for the Confederacy, in any 
way, have now the chance to show their pluck or coward­
ice, and he who falters now makes himself infamous for 
all time (North Carolina State Archives 186 3g :1).
In response to this threat, Governor Vance "officially" or­
dered the construction of breastworks and gun emplacements 
to be constructed in July of 1863. There are many arguments 
as to when the initial construction began. According to an 
article entitled "Our Defenses", which appeared in the Aug­
ust 22, 1863 edition of the Raleigh Registrar, construction
of the fortifications began approximately in May of 1862.
It was stated that
during the last 15 months immense labor has been be­
stowed upon the permanent and temporary fortifications 
of our city, and as common sense would dictate, atten­
tion was first bestowed upon the points which could 
first be capable of strong resistance, or which were 
most exposed to attack (North Carolina State Archives 
186 3c :2) .
North Carolina and Virginia formed a military agency 
known as the Department of North Carolina and Virginia. The 
agency was begun in 1861 and was concerned with the defense 
of strategic locations in each state. "The purpose of the
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department was not only to assist in defending the area be­
tween the James and Potomac rivers, but also to make effec­
tive the blockade of the coast of Virginia and North Carolina'’ 
(Spraggins 1941:163). In order to prevent Federal troops 
from entering the states by way of the coast, the construction 
of fortifications with gun emplacements were needed. Such 
defenses required a large manpower resource and being a per­
iod of war, the states did not have an available number of 
white males to carry out the task. Blacks, however, were 
relatively abundant and manual labor was not alien to them. 
Several months later, an act was passed that required all 
slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 to register in the same 
manner as the free black.
Upon requisition from the president of the Confederate 
States, the government of Virginia would impress slaves 
to work on fortifications and other labor necessary for 
defense of the state. No more than 10,000 could be used 
for more than 60 days or 90 if locals refused to let 
their slaves work. Sixteen dollars a month was paid to 
the master and the slave received soldier's rations, 
medicine, etc. All expenses were paid by the government 
of the Confederate States of America (Spraggins 1941:173).
A similar mobilization of black labor existed in North 
Carolina. The most well-known fortifications were construc­
ted at Wilmington and involved the labor of approximately 
2,000 slaves (Figure 11). After the fortifications had been 
completed and Federal lines were moving deeper into North 
Carolina, Governor Vance stated in the January 4, 1865 edi­
tion of the Weekly Standard:
’Whereas, the long expected attack upon our only remaining 
seaport is now about to be made, and our state is also
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likely to be invaded at other points by an enemy to whom 
mercy and civilization are alike unknown and unregarded; 
whereas all the organized forces of the state already or­
dered to the front may still be insufficient to roll back 
the tide which threatens us from our doors, a fate horrible 
to contemplate. Now, therefore I Zebulon B. Vance Gover­
nor of the State of North Carolina, relying upon the loy­
alty and devotion of her citizens, do issue this my proc­
lamation, commanding all good people, whether by law sub­
ject to military duty or not, who may be able to stand 
behind breastwork and fire a musket, of all ages and con­
ditions, rally at once to the defence of their country 
and hurry to Wilmington (North Carolina State Archives 
1865 : 3) .
Regardless of Vance’s bold speech, Wilmington eventually fell 
into -Federal hands.
Three years before the fall of Wilmington, fortification 
construction had begun at Raleigh. On December 20, 1862, an 
act was ratified that "authorized the Governor to employ slave 
labor in erecting fortifications and other works" (North Car­
olina State Archives 1862:3). As in Virginia, male slaves 
between the ages of 18 and 45 were required to be available 
for labor in the construction of defenses.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RALEIGH FORTIFICATIONS
The construction of the Raleigh fortificat ions began in 
May of 1862. The engineering officer in charge was Lieuten­
ant Colonel Henry T. Guion. Guion served with the 10th Reg­
iment North Carolina State Troops (1st Regiment North Caro­
lina Artillery). Me had risen from the rank of Captain to 
Major on April 13, 1863 and five months later was promoted
to Lieutenant Colonel. Guion’s previous engineering exper­
ience had been primarily in the eastern part of the state.
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Prior to his assignment at Raleigh, he directed the con­
struction of the fieldworks at Greenville, Goldsboro, and 
Fort Macon.
Lieutenant Colonel Guion and his assistant superin­
tendent of works, James Holister, were allotted approxi­
mately 263 slave and 23 free black laborers (Figure 12}. 
Payroll records indicate that the laborers came from 15 
different North Carolina counties and each worked an aver­
age of 30 to 35 days (Figure 13}. The owners were paid 
$1.00 a day per slave which they allowed to work. Available 
records indicate cost of the labor totalled $8036.50 
(Coker 19 66}.
Fifteen months of construction produced a ’’small ring 
of earthworks” that extended approximately four miles (Olds 
1915:2}. They were of simple construction and typical of 
those adapted to mid-19th century warfare (Figure 14}. Guion, 
himself, referred to the works in July of 1863 as being 
"thrown up” around the city (Coker 1966}. Despite their 
relative simplicity, they .were not constructed in a haphaz­
ard manner. The careful placement of limited works at stra­
tegic points followed the traditional principles which guided 
field fortification construction. The application of these 
principles was evident in the construction of American Revo­
lutionary War defenses and clearly guided the building of the 
Confederate defenses nearly 100 years later around the city 
of Raleigh. The fortification plans for Raleigh were briefly
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Figure 14. The Confederate fortifications of Raleigh,
North Carolina as they appeared
in 1865 (Coker 1966).
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summarized in a local newspaper article entitled "Our De­
fenses" which stated that
in so extensive a system of works it is difficult to 
bring every portion up at once to the same standard of 
strength; during the last 15 months immense labor has 
been bestowed upon the permanent and temporary fortifi­
cations of our city, and as common sense would dictate, 
attention was first bestowed upon the points which could 
be capable of strong resistance, or which were the most 
exposed to attack. The next thing to be done was to 
connect these points, and the next to increase the cap­
acity of defense of every part to the greatest possible 
extent. The second part of the work was long since 
effected, and the third is now in steady progress, nor 
do we expect that it will be suspended so long as the 
enemy defer their attack, whether the delay be one month 
or two years (North Carolina State Archives 1863c:2).
The type of fortification constructed at points, consid­
ered most vulnerable to attack was the shelter trench. The 
construction of the trench at selected points was the first 
stage in fortifying Raleigh. As many as five separate trenches 
were independently dug during the initial phases of construc­
tion. Although the simple trenches were little more than rifle 
pits and provided minimal cover, they could be constructed in 
a short period of time. Simultaneous trenching at numerous 
locations around the city insured proper defensive strength 
for the primary stage of fortification construction.
The second phase of construction was the elaboration of 
the shelter trench into more protective forms of works. They 
were developed into half-closed parapets suitable for gun 
emplacements. According to Olds (1915:2) these were strategi­
cally placed around the city and were strengthened with tim­
ber. There were 18 such strengthened positions and each had
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developed from a basic form of shelter trench. The original 
five trenches and subsequent gun emplacements formed the uia- 
jor outward projections of the fortification system. Addi­
tional gun emplacements were added during the third phase of 
construct ion.'
Upon completion of the works at the most strategic lo­
cations, efforts concentrated on joining the defenses. Trench 
lines connected the major gun emplacements with smaller secon­
dary emplacements built into the line. The trenches were 
approximately eight feet wide and five feet deep. There was 
no ledge left at the base of the interior slope of the breast­
work and trench. The stiff, clayey soil of the piedmont re­
gion allowed this to be removed without fear of the fortifi­
cation collapsing (Brackenbury 1888:23). The top of the 
breastwork, or its superior slope, was four feet wide and 
flattened, as was common (Figure 15). The flat surface fac­
ilitated the movement of workmen along the line of works as 
well as aided the defender. The plane surface which topped 
the breastwork enabled the defender to direct his line of 
fire toward the enemy without betraying his position. The 
fortifications we re constructed so that they would Mlook as 
much as possible like the natural ground in the neighbor­
hood, so as to afford as bad a target as possible’’ (Brack­
enbury 18 8 8:23).
Close examination indicates that their placement was 
influenced by several factors. First, the defenses were
Figure 15. The top of the breastwork showing the trench line on the left 
with a noticeable drop in elevation on the breastwork's outer 
(western) face.
48
designed to enclose as much of the North Carolina Railroad 
as possible. Of primary importance was the protection of 
the two railroad depots and associated warehouses. The care­
ful placement of the eastern and southern defenses allowed 
the greatest distances possible between these defenses and 
the storage/control areas. Second, all the defenses were 
constructed on high ground. This is clearly evident when 
the line of works is traced on a modern contour map of the 
city (Figure 16). Landmarks such as Devereau Meadow, St. 
Mary’s College, and Dorthea Dix Hospital occupy land char­
acterized by a noticeable drop in elevation immediately to 
their west -- outside the defended area.
A more dramatic drop in elevation is evident south of 
the city. The distinct advantage of defending high ground 
in this area supports the reasoning behind the concentration 
of gun emplacements in the south/southeast extension of the 
works (Olds 1915:2). A third factor which influenced the 
strategic placement of major segments of the defenses was 
the probable direction from which the city would be attacked. 
It was apparent early in the war that the Federals would 
attempt to capture the port city of Wilmington and take 
gradual control of the entire North Carolina coast. As Fed­
eral forces became more firmly established in the coastal 
region, raiding parties would infiltrate the state's inter­
ior. With raids on a number of eastern North Carolina towns, 
it was logical to assume that Raleigh would be a prime target.
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Boulevard.
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Therefore, close attention to the placement of the eastern 
and southern defenses was imperative. They were extended 
to prevent quick access to the city by way of the major roads. 
Allowing adequate distance between these defenses and the 
economic sectors of the city was a major concern. Examina­
tion of the structural aspects typical of the Raleigh de­
fenses can best be seen in surviving remnants (Figure 17). 
Perhaps the most well-preserved section of the fortifications 
is located adjacent to the tracks of the Seaboard Coast Line 
in the northern extension (Figures 18 and 19). This line of 
works was first studied in a 1936 Federal Writer’s Project.
It was reported in a local newspaper in reference to this 
project and this particular section of works that
The clearly perceptible earthworks abudding on the west 
side of North Blount Street, a few hundred feet south­
east of the three story community house of Pilot Mills, 
may be taken as a starting point for tracing the line 
of the fortifications. Following Blount Street north 
to the railroad tracks and turning southwest across the 
track and open ground a few hundred feet to the edge of 
of the wood and following the clearly defined embankment 
about 400 yards to the bridge on Fairview Road across 
from Pigeon House Branch. These two sections of old 
breastworks are about one fourth of a mile apart, and 
between them no connecting link is now perceptible 
(North Carolia State Archives 1936:1).
The 1936 investigation located these two major extensions 
with less perceptible remnants found extending to the south 
of the city. Of the two extensions identified, only one re­
mains clearly discernable today. It is the network that runs 
adjacent to the railroad and Downtown Boulevard and extends 
to the bridge on Fairview Road (Figure 20).
Figure 17. Retracing of the Confederate defenses on a current city map 
of Raleigh, North Carolina.
Figure 18. View of the wooded area in which the northern fortification  
network is located . The tracks of the Seaboard Coast Line 
run north/south on top of the ridge evident in the background.
Figure 19. Most clearly discernable remnant of the northern fortifications 
adjacent to to the Downtown Boulevard.
Figure 20. The Downtown Boulevard as seen from the main trench line in 
the northern fortifications.
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The line of works was constructed on the side of a 
natural hill and elevated approximately 27 feet above land 
immediately to the west (Figures 21 and 22). The principal 
concern in planning this section was the utilization of high 
ground in the defense of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad. 
Proper defensive strength in this area was important in mon­
itoring the transport of troops and supplies into and out of 
the city.
The northern defenses were strengthened by the construc­
tion of a series of rifle or shelter pits in front of and 
below the main trench line (Figures 23 and 24). Whereas the 
main trench line was approximately eight feet wide and five 
feet deep, the pits were dug one and one-half to two feet deep 
and placed behind a small, eighty-three foot long east/west 
breastwork. Although it was common practice to keep the 
rifle pits independent of each other as an outer defense, 
joining the pits by means of the breastwork strengthened the 
flank protection offered by the works. Because the pits 
were located only one hundred forty feet to the north of 
and somewhat perpendicular to the main trench, communication 
between the works was adequate. Hence, the rifle pits could 
be easily abandoned for the main defense (Figure 25).
As previously stated, the Raleigh fortifications were 
first constructed at strategic points around the city and 
gradually connected as available time and labor permitted. 
Maximum simplicity in design was achieved by strengthening
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Figure 22. Contour map of a segment of the northern fortifications identified in the 
1936 Federal Writer's Project.
Figure 23. Rifle pits constructed immediately north of and below the main 
trench line in the northern fortifications. Note the railroad cars 
of the Seaboard Coast Line in the background.
Figure 24. Rifle pits constructed immediately north of and below the 
main trench line in the northern fortifications.
Figure 25. View of the main trench line as seen from the ridge above  
and behind the fortifications.
51
those points most capable of strong resistance. Trench lines 
connected these points and were extended to incorporate areas 
vulnerable to attack. They were strategically placed with 
gun emplacements on high ground and thus provided strong de­
fensible positions. In addition to the careful placement of 
the works, the Raleigh fortifications, like the American de­
fenses of Philadelphia, were constructed with the understand­
ing that unnecessary elaboration in fortification does not 
lead to the success of the work nor can it stop a determined 
enemy.
CIVILIAN REACTION TO THE RALEIGH FORTIFICATIONS
Prior to the completion of the fortifications, the 
citizens of Raleigh were reassured that effective measures 
were being taken to protect their city from Federal raids.
In August of 1863, General Joseph Johnston inspected Lieu­
tenant Colonel Guion's defensive works. It was reported in 
the Raleigh Registrar ’’that the strong and weak points of 
our defenses have been closely scanned by the intelligent 
eye of the commanding General, and provisions made for 
promptly strengthening such parts as requires it" (North Car­
olina State Archives 1863c:2).
In addition to the high level of planning that went into 
the construction of such an "extensive system of works” a 
movement was under way to organize the civilian inhabitants 
of the city into a home guard. The attitude of the population
during the last phase of construction of the fortifications 
was that "every citizen of Raleigh able to bear arms, and 
large numbers of citizens from other points who have tender­
ed their services, will man these entrenchments" (North Car­
olina State Archives 1863e:l). On Tuesday, July 14, 1863, 
a large number of citizens gathered at the courthouse where
Governor Vance was present and explained the object of 
the meeting. In the course of his remarks, he entered 
into the details of the means of the defense within his 
power. It was announced to the meeting, and amid loud 
applause, that the cadets of the Hillsboro Military 
Academy had volunteered their services in any emergency 
to defend the city; also that the employees of the North 
Carolina Railroad had organized themselves into a com­
pany for the same purpose (North Carolina State Archives 
186 5b : 3) .
A meeting had been held at the same location several days
earlier and it also concerned the
means of placing the city in a state of defence against 
Yankee raids. The meeting was addressed by Governor 
Vance and Ex-Governor Bragg, after which there was an 
enrollment of a large number of names for service, either 
in the cavalry, artillery or infantry branch of the ser­
vice. Every man in Raleigh who can do duty will, we are 
sure, do so if the emergency requires it, and we feel 
very sure that if Yankee thieves come here after wool, 
they will go back shorn (North Carolina State Archives 
1863f : 1) .
There was growing concern among the citizens of Raleigh 
that the capital would soon be attacked by the Pederals. War­
saw, North Carolina had been raided on July 8, 1863 and Rocky 
Mount on the 29th of the same month. The enemy, it was said, 
saved nothing .
Whatever is valuable, that can be carried off, they steal; 
what cannot be removed, they destroy. Mills, graineries, 
cattle, horses, slaves, provisions of all kinds -- even . 
agricultural implements; what may be of most importance
53
to our people ^ or the destruction of which would cause 
the most suffering, seem to be the objects at which 
their efforts are chiefly directed... (North Carolina 
State Archives 18 6 3d : 2 3 .
Descriptions of such warfare tactics were commonplace in 
Raleigh newspapers in 1864-1865 and as the war grew closer 
to home, they served with other articles to instill hatred 
and fear into the people, while at the same time reaffirming 
the defensive measures taken to protect the community (Fig­
ure 26). Citizens "prepared for the fate which had befallen 
Atlanta, Savannah, Columbia, and other cities which had been 
captured by Sherman" (Yates 194 1:32 7). 11 i s policy in his 
march through the south is evident in several of his state­
ments. Me concluded that
until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy 
it; but the utter destruction of the roads, houses and 
people will cripple their military resources... I can 
make the march, and make Georgia howl (Sherman quoted 
from Fuller 1961:108).
He stated with regard to South Carolina that
we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile 
people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel 
the hard hand of war... The truth is the whole army is 
burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance 
upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate 
(Sherman quoted from Fuller 1961:109).
The route of his march into North Carolina and towards 
the capital, was predicted by several Confederate generals. 
"Generals Beauregard, Johnston, Hardee, Moke, Hampton, and 
Wheeler assembled their forces thinking that perhaps Raleigh 
could be defended" (Yates 1941:326). The prospect of such a 
stand grew dim as Sherman's troops advanced rapidly. "Cover-
Figure 26.*The Southern viewpoint* as depicted by the artist 
John Adalbert Volck (Angle 1967).
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nor Vance asked General Johnston what was the best thing to
do and he replied -- that he should make the best terms he
could for the protection of the capital city and its people"
(Yates 1941:327)
...General Johnston had given Governor Vance notice of 
his intention to uncover Raleigh, so that such prepara­
tion as could be made to meet the emergency had been 
finished. A vast amount of state property had been re­
moved to various places along the North Carolina Rail­
road, mainly to Graham, Greensboro, and Salisbury, in­
cluding blankets, clothing, overcoats, English cloth 
enough for 100,000 uniforms, 10,000 pair of shoes, great 
quantities of cotton cloth, yarns, cotton cards, bacon, 
corn, medical stores, 6,000 scythe blades, together with 
the public records, Vance and the other state officers 
having worked day and night so that before noon on April 
12, everything had been shipped (Olds 1915:2).
Governor Vance took the advice of General Johnston and 
on April 12 , 1865 , sent Surgeon-General Edward Warren, Colonel 
Jason Burr, and Majo-r John Devereaux by train to meet with 
General Sherman. The train, however, was stopped by the Con­
federate forces of General Hampton and was ordered by the 
General to return to Raleigh. The train reversed its direc­
tion and, before reaching Raleigh, was stopped by Federal 
troops. The representatives of the governor were escorted 
to Clayton where they met with Sherman. They conveyed the 
governorTs request that the city be spared and that a peace­
ful transition of authority take place. Sherman assured the 
individuals that the governor's wishes would be respected as 
long as no resistance was met.
At sunrise of a cloudy day, April 13, 1865, a "cortege" 
for the city rode out of Raleigh to meet Sherman. Its 
mission was to formally surrender the capital. In the
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carriage were Raleigh’s mayor and a few other leading 
citizens. One of them, riding in the seat with the 
driver, carried a stick with a white cloth tied to its 
tip. He planted the surrender symbol above the empty 
fortifications and the group waited in the rain until 
eight o ’clock that morning when, through fieldglasses , 
Sherman's advanced cavalry came into sight [Waugh 196 7:82) .
The town was quiet as his troops marched in. Sherman him­
self remained only briefly. Before his departure to Durham, 
he ordered three of his men to destroy Whitaker's Mill. This 
was the only destruction that took place and "on the whole, 
the frightened little city was scarcely touched" (Yates 
1941:331). For the citizens of Raleigh, the War was over.
CHAPTER IV
MAXIMUM BENEFIT THROUGH MINIMAL EFFORT 
Research on the Confederate defenses around Raleigh 
provides not only an historical account of their construc­
tion but considerable insight into their practical value as 
a means of protecting the city. The primary goal in this 
research is to evaluate the fortification system based on 
the efficiency of its construction in relation to the gen­
eral type of warfare practiced during the last three years 
of the Civil War. Prior to this evaluation, a discussion 
of efficient action will clarify the relationship between 
this field of study and fortification construction around 
the city
EFFICIENT ACTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT
Efficient construction with effective results were two 
basic engineering goals in field fortification construction. 
In order to better understand these goals and their applica­
bility to the defensive works of Raleigh, a discussion of 
efficient action is appropriate. ’’The science of efficient 
action, whatever the field of activity, a one minute per­
formance or a gigantic undertaking, lias received the name of 
praxiology" (Skolimowski 1965:349). It is a science based on
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the study of practical values; values temporarily divorced 
from those of a moral or aesthetic nature. "Praxiology is 
concerned with establishing norms of efficient action, and 
also with evaluating the efficiency of performed actions.
It is a normative discipline'’ (Skolimowski 1965:355).
The science of praxiology had its formal beginning in 
the early 20th century with the writings of the Polish 
philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski. His Practical Essays (1913) 
and A Treatise on Good Work (1955) were major contributions 
in shaping the discipline as a science. Earlier attempts at 
establishing a general theory for efficient action had been 
pursued by writers such as Dunoyer' (1845), Bourdear (1882), 
and Espinas ( 1897) . While these scholars contributed to this 
particular aspect of human action, Kotarbinski is largely 
credited with developing praxiology to its current state.
The method of praxiological study is based on the analy­
sis of practical values, that is, values of efficient action. 
One such value is the economization of human mental and 
physical energy. Skolimowski (1965:355) notes that several 
approaches are often taken to minimize the expenditure of 
energy and are evident in a variety of actions. The con­
struction of the Raleigh fortifications, for example, mini­
mized the potential impact of the Federal cavalry on the 
economic sectors of the city. The construction of the forti­
fications on high ground at strategic locations and subsequent 
connection of the works, created angles of fire too great
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to allow a successful attack. As a consequence, the Raleigh 
defenders occupied an advantageous position compelling Fed­
eral raiders to occupy a disadvantageous position. The 
Federals would have needed three times the number of indi­
viduals manning the entrenchments to equal the advantage 
afforded the defenders from their fortified positions. Hence, 
the Federals would have expended considerably more energy in 
attacking the city than the Confederates in defending it.
Skolimowski points out that the economization of energy 
is also achieved by ’’replacing physical efforts by reflec­
tion” (1965:355). Lieutenant Colonel Guion and his staff of 
engineers minimized unnecessary physical efforts by utilizing 
established principles and techniques of field fortification 
construction. Guion's defensive plan for Raleigh focused on 
the implementation of defensive strategies and tactics in his 
fortification design while adhering to the principle of sim­
plification of procedure. His "method” or approach to the 
construction of the defenses was synonymous with what Skoli­
mowski describes as "system of action” which refers to a way 
of performing a complex action. The action is well-planned 
and "can be systematically applied and consists in the proper 
selection and composition of the elements of the action”
( 1965:35 7) .
If a system of action is carefully planned, then the 
expenditure of human energy will be minimized and the prob­
able success of the activity enhanced. The degree of sue-
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cess is dependent on an increase in effectiveness although
some losses occur in order to attain more substantial gains
(Skol imowski 1966:377).
A great deal of insight into technological progress can
be achieved through the application of the praxiological
model. This requires that the researcher of a specific
branch of learning examine the "pattern of thinking" within
that discipline.
Specific branches of learning originate and condition 
specific modes of thinking and adhere to categories 
through which they can best express their content and 
by means of which they can further progress (Skolimow­
ski 1966 : 3 78) .
For example, surveyors think in terms of accuracy; struc­
tural engineers, in terms of strength; and architects, pri­
marily in terms of aesthetics. Military engineers think of 
fortification as the utilization and transformation of na­
ture to maximize the advantages of strong defensive position. 
Regardless of the discipline, technical development is mea­
sured by attempts to maximize effectiveness while minimizing 
effort. Zipf (1949:1) states that a
person in solving his immediate problems will view these 
against the background of his probable future problems, 
as estimated by himself. Moreover, he will strive to 
solve his problems in such a way as to minimize the to­
tal work that he must expend in solving both his immed­
iate problems and his probable future problems. That 
in turn means that the person will strive to minimize 
the probable average rate of his work-expenditure over 
t ime .
The success of the fortification plan for Raleigh was contin­
gent upon the action having certain characteristics. Guion*s
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design showed a high degree of feasibility, inner harmony, 
flexibility, and maximum simplicity. A continuous supply of 
laborers made feasible the construction of extensive works. 
Construction of the fortifications in stages at the most 
strategic locations around the city insured proper defensive 
strength without unnecessary elaboration. The subsequent 
connection of the strategic points with simple trenches es­
tablished the works as a complete fortification network. The 
strengthened positions and connecting trenches were mutually 
supportive and hence, reduced the possibility of failure in 
any part of the defensive plan.
The simple design of the Raleigh fortifications mini­
mized the amount of human energy necessary to construct them 
and enhanced their probable success against attack. Success, 
however, was also dependent on maximizing the effectiveness 
of an extensive fortification system. The proper management 
of the defensive network was essential and, as suggested by 
numerous defense rallies, required the active participation 
of the civilian populace. Although the fortifications lacked 
the complexity of more advanced forms of fieldworks, the 
carefully planned system of action by which they were con­
structed allowed adequate defense for the city and its in­
habitants .
"VANCEfS FOLLY" ?
Governor Vance's decision to begin construction on 
fortifications around the city of Raleigh in May of 1862
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was an attempt to counter the impact of potential Federal 
cavalry raids on the economic sectors of the city. His 
decision was backed by strong public support in Raleigh and 
agreeable to many North Carolinians who were to supply slave 
laborers from counties across the state. The first year of 
construction passed without incident and after fourteen months 
of construction, the fortification network neared completion. 
During the month of July, 1863, however, just prior to the 
completion of the works in August, a town less than fifty 
miles from the capital was attacked by Federal raiders. The 
severity of the damage spawned numerous appeals among the in­
habitants of Raleigh to organize a home defense. Several pub­
lic meetings were held in which "there was an enrollment of a 
large number of names for service, either in the cavalry, ar­
tillery, or infantry branch of service” (North Carolina State 
Archives 1863f:lj. Despite the enthusiasm of the rallies and 
the pledges of support from citizens such as the employees 
of the North Carolina Railroad, the success of the meetings 
was questionable. The male inhabitants of the city and sur­
rounding area were criticized in the days following the meet­
ings because of their failure to seriously organize and pre­
pare for the threat that the city and its inhabitants faced. 
Although it was acknowledged prior to the completion of the 
fortifications that "cavalry raids are getting to be serious 
things to the people of the Confederacy -- especially to the 
quiet inhabitants of the goodly city..." (North Carolina State
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Archives 1863g:l), successful attempts to organize able- 
bodied citizens for home defense did not materialize. The 
population was content to react to an attack on the city 
only when and "if the emergency requires it" (North Carolina 
State Archives 1863f:l).
In response to the public attitude, local newspapers 
addressed the issue in a direct manner. It was bluntly 
stated that
This is an emergency -- this city is in peril -- and 
those who have as yet found excuses for doing nothing, 
who have not lifted a finger for the Confederacy, in 
any way, have now the chance to show their pluck or 
cowardice, and he who falters now makes himself infam­
ous for all time (North Carolina State Archives 186 3g :1).
On July 15, 1863, an article appeared in the Raleigh Registrar
and was directed more specifically "TO THE MEN OF RALEIGH".
Men of Raleigh, read the letter of the Kinston correspon­
dent of the State Journal and say what you are doing for 
the protection of your homes. True, a large number of 
hands are working on your defenses, but where is the or­
ganization for manning them? Where is the cavalry com­
pany for scouting and bringing in the earliest intelli­
gence of the whereabouts and movements of the enemy?
Wake up, wake up, unless you prefer depredation and out­
rage to a manly defense of your lives and property 
(North Carolina State Archives 1863a:2).
This was followed on the 21st of the same month by another 
article which stated that "Ditching will not save us but a 
vigilant home organization will" (North Carolina State Ar­
chives 18 6 3h:1) . These sentiment s suggest that the defense 
of Raleigh against Federal raids was partly dependent on 
the active participation and organization of the civilian 
population. Contrary to the optimism expressed in local
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defense meetings, the inhabitants had increased fear of 
impending doom in 1863. Economic conditions had worsened 
and the inevitable fate of the Confederacy and the city was 
apparent.
Attempts to organize a local defensive force, regard­
less of its success, was a response to the serious threat 
faced by the inhabitants of the city. The public rallies 
functioned not only to organize and mobilize a defensive 
force but also to reduce the high level of stress and un­
certainty in the population. According to Chappie (1970) 
and Altner (1969), the regular gathering and interaction of 
civilians not only reduced their level of anxiety but en­
couraged differences of opinion to be resolved. "Mobiliza­
tion, by the threat of attack or its actual occurence, dis­
turbs all and is the strongest of unifiers. It Intensifies 
the emotional-interactional patterns of conflicts..." 
(Chappie 1970 : 307).
In contrast to the high level of organization and plan­
ning in the construction of the Raleigh fortifications, the 
organization and implementation of local civilian defensive 
measures in the city were poorly coordinated and lacked im­
plementation. The fortifications, largely the result of a 
military effort using slave laborers, were unmanned for two 
years following their completion in August of 1863 and were 
abandoned upon the approach of Sherman's forces in April of 
1865 (Waugh 1967:82). During this period of time, and for
several years following the surrender of the city, many in­
habitants of Raleigh referred to the entrenchments as "Vance 
Folly" because "the war governor was held responsible for 
them" (Briggs 1936:1). The governor was accused of lacking 
a good sense of foresight in ordering the construction of an 
extensive system of works that were never to be used. 
CONCLUSION
The fortifications of Raleigh were constructed in a 
very efficient manner by an experienced and competent en­
gineering officer in the Confederate States Army. His con­
struction techniques were well-established prior to their 
application in the defensive works at Raleigh and based on 
principles utilized at Philadelphia eighty-three years 
earlier in the American Revolution.
The basic principles of fortification construction 
common in the building of defensive works during the Revo­
lution and the Civil War were based on maximizing the ef­
fectiveness of the fieldworks while minimizing the efforts 
required to construct them. The construction of fortifica­
tions in stages allowed the simplest forms to be built at 
the most strategic locations and then gradually developed 
into more substantial works as available time and labor per­
mitted. The utilization of natural topography, such as high 
ground, and the concealment of works in the local environ­
ment increased the advantages offered by fortified positions 
One of the primary tenets in fieldwork design was limited
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construction void of unnecessary elaboration. Although 
painfully learned by many (Bailey 1983:122) and completely 
ignored by some (Mitchell 1968:14), limitation and simpli­
fication were vital considerations in field fortification 
construction. Such considerations were important as soldiers 
became more professional, weapons more accurate, and strat­
egies and tactics more diverse.
The Raleigh fortifications were primarily built to 
counter the advantages afforded Federal raiders in potential 
skirmish attacks against the city. Raids were characterized 
by swift, calculated attacks directed against the economic 
base of cities and towns. By 1863, they were an important 
strategy in Federal campaigns to defeat the south. Warfare, 
in all its reality, was taken to the people and, although 
not directly inflicted upon the citizens of Raleigh, seemed 
an inevitable fate. Fortification construction was a prac­
tical response to a very real threat. The organization and 
active participation of the civilian population, however, was 
also essential in combating the type of warfare waged against 
the city and its inhabitants.
The citizens of Raleigh and the surrounding area did 
not react to the threat that faced the city until the de­
fenses neared completion in the summer of 1863. No evi­
dence indicates or suggests that the white civilian inhab­
itants of Raleigh directly participated in the construction 
of the works nor did they effectively organize a citizenry
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military force during the thirteen months prior to their 
completion. Although the effective organization of a local 
defensive force was never established, the numerous rallies 
held during the month of July 1863, transformed a period of 
public fear, confusion, and indifference into public unity.
The meetings temporarily reduced the high level of anxiety 
brought on by a depressed economy, the inevitable defeat of 
the Confederacy, and the approach of General Sherman’s forces.
The abandonment of the fortifications in 1865 was not 
due to the citizens’ failure to properly organize and im­
plement a local defense plan. The utilization of such a 
force would have been effective against a raid but not 
against the offensive launched by General Sherman. Likewise, 
the defensive works around the city were simple in nature 
and limited in strength. They were not siege works and of- 
ferred little advantage against a major offensive by a de­
termined enemy. Sherman, not fully aware of their limited 
strength and informed of Governor Vance’s call for batteries 
of artillery to be sent to the city (Olds 1915:2), stated 
in a dispatch to General Kilpatrick
I will push all the columns straight on RALEIGH. I do 
not care about RALEIGH now, but want to defeat and des­
troy the Confederacy. Bo not break the railway between 
here and RALEIGH as we want the rails up to that city 
(Sherman quoted from Olds 1915:2).
The fate of Raleigh was determined not only by Sherman but
by General Johnston and Governor Vance. It was acknowledged
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by all three individuals that the survival of the city 
and its inhabitants was dependent on the abandonment of 
all Confederate resistance, including the symbols of re­
sistance such as the fortification network around the city.
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APPENDIX
The following photographs are of remnants of the 
northern extension of the Civil War fortifications around 
Raleigh, North Carolina. They are located on the eastern 
side of the Downtown Boulevard and adjacent to the tracks 
of the Seaboard Coast Line. Their precise location is 
found in the description provided in the Federal Writer’s 
Project of 1936 (Figures 16 and 17).
S o uth w es t  view of the main trench line in the northernmost fort i f icat ions.
Note the rise in elevat ion to the eas t  ( le f t )  with a noticeable  drop in elevation  
to the w est  (right) .
V i e w  of the  main t r e n c h  line looking north  in the  n o r t h e r n m o s t  f o r t i f i c a t io n s .
N o r t h w e s t  v ie w  of the  main t r e n c h  line in th e  n o r th e rn  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .
N o r th e r n  v ie w  of the  main t re n c h  line in the  n o r t h e r n m o s t  fo r t i f ic a t io n s .
V i e w  of the  main t re n c h  line as s e e n  f rom behind the  n o r th e rn m o s t  fo r t i f ic a t io n s .
N o r t h e r n m o s t  r e m n a n t  of th e  main t r e n c h  line in the  n o r th e rn  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .
E a s te rn  v iew of the hillside behind the major  b r e a s tw o r k  in the northernmost  
for t i f ica t ions.
View of the main trench line in the northern fort i f icat ions. Note the immediate  
drop in elevat ion in front (west)  of the main breastwork.
A n o t ic e a b le  change  in the s ize  and height of the b r e a s tw o r k  in the  
northern fo r t i f ica t ions  suggests  that  the posit ion may have been the  
locat ion of a gun em placem e nt .  R e fe r  to the locat ion  of the site on 
the C o n fe d e r a te  plan of the w orks  (Figure 13).
Erosion on the outer  (w e s te r n )  fa c e  of the main b r e a s tw o r k  in the  
northern fo r t i f ica t ions .
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